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Given that familiarity is closely associated with positivity, the
authors sought evidence for the idea that positivity would
increase perceived familiarity. In Experiment 1, smiling and
thus positively perceived novel faces were significantly more
likely to be incorrectly judged as familiar than novel faces with
neutral expressions. In Experiment 2, subliminal association
with positive affect (a positively valenced prime) led to false rec-
ognition of novel words as familiar. In Experiment 3, validity
judgments, known to be influenced by familiarity, were more
likely to occur if participants were in happy mood states than
neutral mood states. Despite their different paradigms and
approaches, the results of these three studies converge on the idea
that, at least under certain circumstances, the experience of
positivity itself can signal familiarity, perhaps because the
experience of familiarity is typically positive.
Keywords: familiarity; positivity; affect; recognition; heuristic
Repeated exposure to stimuli generates positive
affect. Repeated exposure has long been known to
increase preference for the reexposed stimulus itself
(Zajonc, 1968; see Bornstein, 1989, for a review) and for
other similar stimuli (Gordon & Holyoak, 1983).
Repeated exposure also generates more general positive
affect, influencing preferences for subsequently pre-
sented stimuli from quite different categories (Garcia-
Marques, 1999; Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 2000;
Monahan, Murphy, & Zajonc, 2000). In addition, a
repetition-induced sense of familiarity has been shown
to produce more positive types of judgments in general;
that is, the more familiarity, the more validity, fame, ease,
and so forth, but not the more falsehood, ignominy, and
difficulty (for an exception, see Mandler, Nakamura, &
Van Brandt, 1987). Finally, repetition appears to gener-
ate a diffuse positive affect that leads individuals to
report being in better moods when they are exposed to
familiar material either supraliminally (Garcia-Marques,
1999; Garcia-Marques, & Mackie, 2000; Harmon-Jones &
Allen, 2001) or subliminally (Monahan et al., 2000).
Positive affect is not, of course, the only consequence
of repetition. In the memory literature, repetition has
been shown to generate a feeling—whether conscious or
unconscious—that the repeated stimulus has been
encountered before. This phenomenological reaction,
which has been loosely referred to as a feeling of famil-
iarity (Schwarz & Clore, 1996; Smith, 2000), is highly
associated with the dynamic nature of (re)processing a
particular previously seen stimulus known as “fluency of
processing” or “perceptual fluency” (Bornstein &
D’Agostino, 1994; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby &
Whitehouse, 1989; Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998;
Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). Evidence for the idea
that fluency underlies the feeling of familiarity and the
use of memory as a tool in recognition judgments
(Jacoby, Allan, Collins, & Larwill, 1988; Jacoby & Dallas,
1981; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989) comes from experi-
ments that show that the artificial enhancement of flu-
ency affects judgments of recognition (Kelley & Jacoby,
1990; Lindsay & Kelley, 1996; Rajaram, 1993). Studies
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also suggest that the experience of familiarity is relatively
easily (mis)attributed to other features of stimuli: The
more familiarity, the more perceived validity (Begg &
Armour, 1991), fame (Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, & Jasechko,
1989), ease (Jacoby et al., 1988), and so forth. This feel-
ing of familiarity appears to be relatively fleeting, diffuse,
and not easily distinguished from other feelings
(Carlson & Hatfield, 1992; Clark, 1982; Jacoby & Kelley,
1987, 1990; Mandler, 1962; Schwarz, 1990; Truax, 1984).
Repeated exposure has thus been shown to produce
both a “feeling of positive affect” and a “feeling of famil-
iarity.” We have argued elsewhere (Garcia-Marques,
1999; Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 2000) that the subjec-
tive feeling of familiarity that occurs as the result of a
match between rudimentary stimulus processing and
the contents of memory is experienced as a facilitation in
processing that has a positive valence; that is, the experi-
ence of familiarity, whether conscious or unconscious, is
inherently charged or imbued with positive affect. This
view is consistent with some earlier descriptions of famil-
iarity as a “pleasant feeling” (Tichener, 1910), as “a feel-
ing with a positive affective tone” (Pittman, 1992), and as
a “subjectively positive experience” (Jacoby & Kelley,
1990; Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989).
If the subjective experience of repeated exposure is
inherently charged or imbued with positive affect, then
positivity itself may signal familiarity; that is, if positivity is
inherently associated with familiarity, then a positive
reaction to a stimulus might well be experienced as an
indication that the stimulus itself is familiar. Given the
diffuse nature of both familiarity and positivity, it is also
possible that positivity induced by sources other than
repetition might under certain conditions be mistaken
for a cue for familiarity. Thus, not only should manipula-
tions of familiarity promote perceived positivity, as has
been amply demonstrated, but manipulations that asso-
ciate positive affect with stimuli should promote per-
ceived familiarity. In this article, we report three studies
designed to show such effects. We sought evidence that
manipulated positivity generated well-established effects
typically associated with manipulations of familiarity.
The first two studies tested the hypothesis that associat-
ing positivity with a stimulus would affect recognition in
the same way that repeating a stimulus does.
EXPERIMENT 1
If positivity signals familiarity, stimuli that evoke a pos-
itive affective reaction should be misjudged as familiar
more often than stimuli that do not evoke such a reac-
tion. We tested this idea by showing participants faces
that were either novel or familiar and either smiling
(and thus positive) or not. We hypothesized that novel
smiling faces would be misjudged as familiar more often
than novel neutral faces.
Method
PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN
Sixteen University of California, Santa Barbara
(UCSB), men participated in exchange for class credit
and completed all procedures and measures individually
in computer cubicles. The design was a 2 (old vs. new
face) × 2 (neutral vs. smiling face) within-subjects facto-
rial design crossed with two counterbalancing factors
(the set of faces that was repeated and the set of faces that
was smiling were systematically varied). Because the
between-subjects counterbalancing factors had no effect
in initial analyses, they were not included in further
analyses of the results.
STIMULUS PHOTOS
Participants saw a series of color photos (Computer
Vision Laboratory Face Data Base, http://
www.lrv.fri.uni-lj.si/facedb.html) depicting men in
everyday, causal clothing pictured roughly from head to
chest. These photos were presented on IBM PCs and
appeared as a 5-in. (high) × 7-in. (wide) block on the
screen. Because all the faces were male, we used only
male participants to avoid cross-gender perception influ-
ences.1
PROCEDURE
Participants were told that the two-phase study con-
cerned “how people process faces.” In the first phase,
they saw 24 male faces presented on the computer
screen, each for 1 s. The 24 faces were presented in a dif-
ferent random order for each participant; 12 faces were
smiling and 12 had a neutral facial expression.
Next, participants engaged in a roughly 8-min filler
task. In this task, an outline of the United States
appeared on the computer screen and one of the states
was highlighted in yellow. Participants were given 10 s to
identify and type out the name of the highlighted state.
After the 10 s had elapsed, the computer screen
advanced and participants were again shown a map of
the United States, this time with a different state high-
lighted. All 50 states were presented in a different ran-
dom order for each participant.
After the filler task, participants were instructed about
the next phase of the experiment. They were then pre-
sented with 48 faces, 24 of which were old (had appeared
in the first phase) and 24 of which were novel (had not
been seen before). Twelve of the old and 12 of the novel
faces were smiling, and 12 of the old and 12 of the novel
faces had neutral facial expressions. A face appeared on
the screen, with the labels “old” and “new” underneath.
Participants were instructed to select “old” if they had
seen the photo earlier or “new” if they had not. The 48
faces were presented in a different random order for
each participant. As noted earlier, there were two
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between-subjects counterbalancing factors. The first
counterbalancing factor concerned which subset of the
photos was repeated. The second counterbalancing fac-
tor was the facial expression of each person. Across the
cells of this 2× 2 design, each pictured person was used as
a repeated and as a novel face and had either a smiling or
neutral facial expression. After making all 48 old/new
judgments, participants completed a few demographic
questions, were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.
Results and Discussion
The number of times a face was labeled as “old” was
used as the dependent variable in a 2 (old vs. new face) ×
2 (neutral vs. smiling face) repeated-measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA). The results revealed the typical sig-
nificant main effect for repetition, F(1, 15) = 242.47, p <
.001, MSe = 3.06. On average, 18.38 of the 24 previously
seen faces were correctly identified as “old,” whereas an
average of 4.75 out of the 24 novel faces were falsely rec-
ognized. Of direct relevance to our hypothesis, this main
effect was qualified by a significant interaction with facial
expression, F(1, 15) = 4.63, p = .048, MSe = 1.35. Faces that
were in fact familiar (repeated) were correctly recog-
nized at about the same rate regardless of facial expres-
sion (M = 9.06 smiling and M = 9.31 neutral, both out of
12), t(15) = –0.56, p = .580. As expected, however, novel
smiling faces were significantly more likely to be falsely
recognized as familiar (M = 2.875, both out of 12) than
novel neutral faces, (M = 1.875, both out of 12), t(15) =
2.51, p = .024.
Two conclusions can be drawn from these findings.
First, perceiving a stimulus as positive significantly
increased the probability that the stimulus also seemed
familiar. Second, this effect was limited to the perception
of novel faces: When other cues existed that allowed par-
ticipants to make old or new judgments confidently,
positivity of the stimulus did not influence those ratings.
This finding is consistent with the role of familiarity in
recognition judgments—as recollection increases, the
role of other cues decreases (Yonelinas, 1997).
These results are consistent with our hypothesis that
positivity cues familiarity, perhaps because of the close
association between familiarity and positivity. In addi-
tion, these results are consistent with those of Baudouin,
Gilibert, Sansone, and Tiberghien (2000). In their first
experiment, for example, participants saw photos of
famous and unknown persons, exhibiting both a smiling
and neutral expression. On each trial, participants had
to decide as quickly and accurately as possible if the face
was “familiar” or “unfamiliar.” Their results showed that
facial expression had no impact on accuracy for identify-
ing famous faces. However, for unknown faces, partici-
pants were more likely to label the face as familiar if it was
smiling than if it had a neutral expression.
Because both our participant population and our
stimulus materials were male, because the smiling and
neutral faces were closely similar but not identical, and
because attractiveness might have influenced familiarity
ratings, however, we tested our hypothesis again in a sec-
ond study. Moreover, in this second study, we wanted to
make perception of the stimulus as positive much more
subtle by making this association unconscious. We
achieved this within a completely different experimental
paradigm.
EXPERIMENT 2
Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989) demonstrated that
enhancing the processing fluency of a novel word (by
subliminally priming the word with itself) during a test
phase enhances the probability of its false recognition. If
the subjective experience of repeated exposure is also
positive, as we argue, then subliminally imbuing the
word with positive affect also should boost false recogni-
tion in the same way.
Our experimental paradigm was based on Murphy
and Zajonc’s (1993) demonstration of subliminal affec-
tive priming: Chinese ideographs preceded by sublimi-
nal happy faces are evaluated more positively than ideo-
graphs preceded by subliminal sad faces. Their findings
show that this technique successfully imbues a stimulus
with positive affect, as required to appropriately test our
hypothesis. We thus presented participants with novel or
repeated words, some of each of which were preceded by
subliminally presented positive or neutral stimuli. We
expected that stimuli imbued unconsciously with posi-
tive affect would be falsely reported as familiar more so
than those not associated with positivity.
Method
PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN
A total of 52 (11 male, 41 female) Portuguese under-
graduates participated in a 2 (novel and repeated words)
× 2 (positive and neutral prime) × 2 (novel or repeated
status of word) × 2 (association of positive or neutral
prime with words) factorial design. Unfamiliar (novel)
and familiar (repeated) words, primed by either a happy
face or a similar but neutral stimulus, defined two within-
subjects factors. Which words were deemed old and new
and which words were preceded by the positive or neu-
tral prime were completely counterbalanced between
subjects.2
PROCEDURE
The study was presented as a “memory study,” where
the “study list” of 30 words was presented for 1 s on a com-
puter screen. The 30 words presented were two of four
sets of 15 two-syllable Portuguese words of moderate
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familiarity (e.g., boat, necklace) (see Marques, 1997, for
details).
Immediately after studying the list of words, partici-
pants performed a filler task. During this task, a Euro-
pean map was presented sequentially 20 times on the
computer, and each time, a different country was high-
lighted accompanied by a list of nine countries. Partici-
pants were asked to identify the highlighted country by
pressing a key corresponding to what they believed to be
the correct answer from the list. This task had a mean
duration of 15 min.
In the following “recognition task,” participants were
presented with a list of 60 words (30 previously presented
and 30 novel words). They were required to press one
key if the word presented on the screen was “new” and a
different key if the word was “old.” Half of each set of
words was immediately preceded by the subliminal
(under 12 ms) presentation of either a happy face ( )
or a circle with no details ( ). The diameter of these
primes was 3 cm. Pretesting had established that the pre-
sentation of these two stimuli was associated with differ-
ent mood ratings both in a supraliminal condition
(happy M = 6.28, circle M = 5.09), t(91) = 2.65, p < .005,
and a subliminal condition (happy M = 6.53, circle M =
4.71), t(85) = 5.12, p < .001, confirming the affective con-
sequences of the manipulation. Words were presented in
a circle to completely mask the prime.
Results and Discussion
The number of times participants judged a word to be
“old” was analyzed in the mixed ANOVA model associ-
ated with the complete design. The results revealed the
typical significant main effect for repetition, F(1, 48) =
171.64, p < .0001, MSe = 4.87. On average, 21 of the 30
previously seen words were correctly identified as old,
whereas an average of 13 out of the 30 novel words were
falsely recognized. Of direct relevance to our hypothesis,
this main effect was qualified by a significant interaction
with prime valence, F(1, 48) = 6.47, p < .014, MSe = 3.36.
Words that were in fact familiar were correctly recog-
nized as such at about the same rate regardless of prim-
ing, F(1, 48) = 2.13, p < .15 (M neutral = 10.72 and M posi-
tive = 10.25). As expected, however, novel words primed
with happy faces were significantly more likely to be
falsely recognized as familiar (M = 6.89) than novel
words primed with a neutral stimulus (M = 5.97), F(1, 48)
= 4.67, p < .035 (see Figure 1).3
These results suggest that the association of a positive
experience with a novel neutral stimulus was interpreted
as if the stimulus were in fact familiar. Thus, positivity
apparently signaled familiarity just as actual familiarity,
induced through repetition, signaled familiarity, and
both increased recognition. Replicating the results of
Experiment 1, familiar stimuli were less susceptible to
the affect manipulation, suggesting that affective activa-
tion does not add anything to an already present feeling
of familiarity (Yonelinas, 1997). The two studies thus
show the predicted effect emerging with different stim-
uli (faces in Experiment 1, words in Experiment 2) with
the positivity either inherent (Experiment 1) or associ-
ated (Experiment 2) with the stimulus and either con-
scious (Experiment 1) and unconscious (Experiment
2).
In both experiments, we thus demonstrated that asso-
ciating positivity to a stimulus caused significantly
increased false recognition of that stimulus as familiar.
We interpret these findings as occurring because the
affective feeling generated by the associated smile or
happy symbols was easily taken as the positive affective
quality attendant on familiarity. In a third experiment,
we further tested this hypothesis by assuming that the
way perceivers feel at the time of stimuli processing
might have a similar effect; that is, we tested the idea that
happy perceivers also might be more likely to
misperceive stimuli as familiar, perhaps because they
used their positive feelings as a familiarity cue.
EXPERIMENT 3
In this experiment, we first induced either
nonpositive (neutral) or positive mood states and then
led participants to believe (falsely) that they had been
subliminally exposed to stimulus sentences whose valid-
ity they were then forced to judge.4 The impact of famil-
iarity on validity judgments is well established: Repeated
statements are judged to be truer than novel ones
(Arkes, Boehm, & Xu, 1991; Begg & Armour, 1991; Begg,
Armour, & Kerr, 1985). We predicted that participants
would take the subjective experience of their positive
affective state as if they were experiencing familiarity
with the sentence and, therefore, that participants in
positive moods would make more extreme validity judg-
ments than those in neutral affective states.
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Figure 1 The impact of positive compared to neutral priming on rec-
ognition of repeated and novel words, Experiment 2.
Method
PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN
Sixty (16 male, 44 female) UCSB undergraduates
were paid $10 to participate in the study. Participants
were randomly assigned to a neutral or positive mood
condition.
PROCEDURE
Participants were invited to sit in front of an IBM-PC
computer monitor on which all instructions were pre-
sented. Initial instructions indicated that they would first
evaluate a newspaper article for use in a future experi-
ment (actually a cover story for the induction of mood)
and then participate in a study investigating “uncon-
scious perception.”
INDUCTION OF MOOD
A nonpositive (neutral) mood state was induced by
having participants evaluate a fake newspaper article,
titled “A Different Kind of Physician,” which described
an experimental program for medical students. Positive
mood was induced by evaluation of an article called
“Meeting Them More Than Halfway,” describing a
reunion of old friends at a country inn. Each article was a
page in length and was presented in newspaper-like, two-
column format to preserve the cover story. These materi-
als were adapted from Kuykendall and Keating (1990)
and have been used successfully as mood inductions in
this population (Queller, Mackie, & Stroessner, 1996;
Wegener & Petty, 1994, Exp. 2; Wegener, Petty, & Smith,
1995, Exp. 2). Participants read the articles and then
responded to two 7-point scales indicating “How much
did you enjoy reading this article?” and “How good or
bad do you think the article was?”
VALIDITY JUDGMENTS
Immediately after, participants were introduced to a
“study of unconscious processes.” They were asked to
attend carefully to a black dot presented in the center of
the computer screen. The dot flashed twice before disap-
pearing. Participants were led to believe that each flash
signaled the very brief presentation of a short sentence
on the screen. They were warned that they would “not be
aware of actually seeing the sentences” but that “some
aspects of them would be unconsciously processed” and
would thus affect subsequent performance on a task ask-
ing the participants to guess some of the sentences’
features.
A dot was then rapidly presented three times in the
middle of the screen, giving the illusion of two flashes
(sentences being presented). Participants pressed either
the T (true) key or the F (false) key using the first answer
that popped into their heads to complete the following
sentence: “My feeling is that the two sentences were . . . ”
(i.e., they made judgments about the validity of both sen-
tences together). After completing this forced decision
task, were they asked to rate their perception of the two
sentences’ validity on a 7-point scale (1 = certainly false, 4 =
completely uncertain, and 7 = certainly true). Participants
made only one set of judgments to ensure that any poten-
tial effects of the mood manipulation were demon-
strated before mood started to decay.
CHECK ON MANIPULATION OF MOOD
A “postexperimental control questionnaire” accessed
participants’ “current mood state” on a two-item scale:
(a) “How do you feel right now” (1 = sad, 9 = happy), and
(b) “what is your mood at this very moment” (1 = bad, 9 =
good). Participants then went on to other experiments.
Results and Discussion
EFFECTIVENESS OF MOOD MANIPULATION
Because participants’ ratings of their feelings and of
their mood were correlated (r = .79, p < .001), these rat-
ings were averaged to form a general mood index. Those
in the positive mood condition rated their mood as sig-
nificantly more positive (M = 6.52) than those in the neu-
tral condition (M = 5.70), t(58) = 2.10, p < .02, one-tailed,
MSe = 1.49.
VALIDITY JUDGMENTS
Because familiarity is expected to induce an illusion
of validity, we expected participants in positive moods to
judge the statements they thought they were processing
subliminally as truer than would participants in neutral
moods. Consistent with this prediction, more than
65.6% of the happy participants judged the sentences to
be true, whereas more than 63% of the participants in
the neutral mood condition judged them to be false. The
difference between these two distributions of responses
was significant, χ2(1, N = 60) = 4.79, p < .03.5
Assessment of the confidence with which true and
false judgments were made (rating scales data) revealed
no significant differences between the two mood condi-
tions (t < 1). This result seems to be due to the fact that
most participants (66%) used the “uncertain” point on
the response scale. Nevertheless, the judgment data
show that this uncertainty was resolved quite differently
for happy participants compared to neutral participants.
Given that no stimuli were actually presented, it seems
that participants used their mood state as a cue as to
whether the statement to which they thought they had
been exposed was true or not in the same way the litera-
ture has shown that participants use the feeling of famil-
iarity (Arkes et al., 1991; Begg & Armour, 1991; Begg
et al., 1985). Once again, positivity apparently signaled
familiarity, just as actual familiarity as induced through
repetition has been shown to do. We found these effects
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even though the positivity manipulated in this study was
a general diffuse feeling state induced prior to (and not
simultaneously with) sentence presentation. The results
were once again consistent with our hypothesis that
positivity engenders perceived familiarity, just as famil-
iarity engenders perceived positivity.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Earlier research has repeatedly shown that previous
exposure to a stimulus generates both positive feelings
(particularly in mere exposure studies) and feelings of
familiarity (particularly in implicit memory studies). We
reasoned that because familiarity engenders positivity,
then positivity might well signal familiarity. When posi-
tive affect was explicitly associated with a stimulus in
Experiment 1 and subliminally associated with a stimu-
lus in Experiment 2, participants were more likely to
think it familiar. When participants believed they were
judging statements in Experiment 3, they were more
likely to think them true (a typical consequence of famil-
iarity) when in a positive mood than when not. Thus, our
results constitute the first demonstration that manipu-
lated associated positivity can be read as a cue to stimulus
familiarity. Our results are consistent with the finding
that naturally occurring attractive faces and positive
words are rated and recognized as more familiar than
unattractive faces and neutral or negative words (Monin,
2003).
Alone, the results of Experiment 3 might be
explained by arguing that positive mood enhances valid-
ity judgments independently of any association with
familiarity. To the extent that “truth” ratings can be re-
garded as positively valenced, the mood-as-information
heuristic might operate in this way (“If I feel good, the
statement must be good, persuasive, valid, true, etc.”).
However, it is more difficult to argue from this perspec-
tive that positive affect should be experienced similarly
to the subjective experience of previously encountering
a stimulus. This is, however, exactly what happened in
Experiments 1 and 2: Faces consciously associated with
positive affect and individual words nonconsciously asso-
ciated with positive affect were falsely recognized as
familiar at a much higher rate than were neutrally posed
faces or neutrally primed words. Thus, across the studies,
different manipulations of positivity produced judg-
ments (recognition, validity) typically produced by
manipulations of familiarity. The most parsimonious
explanation of these findings, as well as those arising
from the mere exposure and implicit memory studies, is
that positivity acts as a cue that the positive stimulus is
familiar.
If it could be established that replying “old” in a recog-
nition task and saying “true” in a validity task were either
the dominant or the acquiescent responses (themselves
empirically debatable propositions), it also might be
argued that our results merely suggest that positivity
(either as a stimulus property or as an induced mood)
increases dominant and acquiescent responses. How-
ever, the data from both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2
are inconsistent with such mechanisms. In both studies,
truly familiar stimuli were not overrecognized (i.e., the
dominant or acquiescent response was not made)
merely because positivity was associated with them com-
pared to when they were neutral (see also Baudouin
et al., 2000, Experiment 1). Future research might
experimentally confirm this finding by manipulating the
proportion of old and new stimuli so that the dominant
response would be new rather than old or replicating
Experiment 3 with judgments that are not related to
familiarity.
Future research also might usefully focus on the limits
of this effect. Our results indicate that when other, per-
haps more definitive, cues to familiarity exist, stimulus
positivity might not further increase familiarity judg-
ments. Thus, neither positive old faces nor positive old
words were more likely to be recognized than neutral old
faces or words. When participants had a good idea that
they had seen the stimuli before, affective reactions
played no role. We suspect that when people are simi-
larly sure that they have never seen a stimulus before, its
affective quality will not influence their judgments.
When uncertainty exists, however, positive affect haws
an impact (see also Monin, 2003, Experiment 5). Fur-
ther investigation of whether or when this influence
occurs, whether it is automatic or conscious, and
whether it can be corrected or not is warranted. Such
work would also shed further light on the mechanism
underlying the effect. We argue that the effect depends
on a confusion of the positivity associated with familiarity
and positivity arising from other aspects of the stimulus
or context. Others have suggested that such effects
might be due to semantic associations between valanced
concepts such as familiarity and positivity (Clore &
Colcombe, 2003; Schwarz & Clore, 1983), but the results
of Experiments 2 and 3 make this explanation less viable.
Another possibility is that people use a “warm glow” heu-
ristic (Monin, 2003) to assess stimulus familiarity by ask-
ing “Do I like the stimulus?” Like other misattributional
interpretations of familiarity effects, our approach
assumes in contrast that such effects might be reduced
when people are consciously aware of their liking for the
stimulus (Bronstein, 1999). The use of attributional and
correctional manipulations and paradigms will help to
clarify further differences among these possibilities.
Our experiments do not rule out the possibility that
any associated affect—not just positive affect—might
make a stimulus seem more familiar. We tested the idea
that positivity would cue familiarity because of the sub-
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stantial empirical record showing that familiarity,
induced by repetition, results in positive affective out-
comes. Because the fluency of repeated processing and
positivity appear closely associated, we reasoned and
found that positivity might be used, sometimes mistak-
enly, as a cue for familiarity. It is possible, however, that
the experience of other affective reactions also might
produce false familiarity judgments, for a slightly differ-
ent reason. Perhaps imbuing any stimulus with intense
affect results in more fluent processing of the stimulus,
an effect that could, under the right circumstances, be
misattributed to familiarity. If any affect came to be asso-
ciated with (even false) familiarity, then that affect also
might come to signal familiarity in the future. This possi-
bility awaits empirical testing and is interesting because it
suggests that with some conditioning, even negative
affect might cue familiarity.
Associating negativity to a stimulus could, of course,
be thought to have the opposite effect: stimulus
negativity might be expected to generate perceptions of
novelty. Although this is clearly an empirically testable
possibility, it does not follow from our argument that
positivity signals familiarity because the experience of
familiarity is positive. Given that both positive and nega-
tive affect may well represent two largely independent
and orthogonal dimensions, they are just as likely to con-
tribute quite independently to evaluation and judgment
(Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994).
We based our hypothesis that positivity could cue
familiarity on the assumption that reexposure to a previ-
ously encountered stimulus results in a subjective feeling
of familiarity that is inherently positive (Jacoby & Kelley,
1990; Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; Pittman, 1992;
Tichener, 1910; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). Our
results add further empirical support to that assumption.
The idea that facilitation of processing is imbued with
positive affect also has some support in research on the
effects of mood. From our perspective, it is not strange
that transient mood state and the fluency associated with
familiarity have been induced in the laboratory by
exactly the same manipulation: contraction of specific
muscles. Stepper and Strack (1993) manipulated the
subjective recall experiences of their participants by ask-
ing them to contract either the corrugator muscle or the
zygomaticus muscle during the recall task. Contraction
of the zygomaticus muscle at the upper side of the mouth
(used in producing a smile) triggered a feeling of ease or
fluency in recall, whereas contraction of the corrugator
muscle (producing a furrowed brow), in contrast, was
associated with the experience of effort and thus
induced a feeling of lack of fluency, a feeling of difficulty
in recall. Exactly the same manipulation also has been
used both to measure the affective impact of fluency of
processing (Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001) and to
manipulate mood: Whereas the contraction of the
zygomaticus induces positive feelings, contraction of the
corrugator muscle induces more negative feelings
(Adelmann & Zajonc, 1989; Bodenhausen, Kramer, &
Susser, 1994; Laird, 1984; Strack, Martin, & Stepper,
1988). Our position also is consistent with the fact that
the feeling of fluency (whether evoked by repetition or
other means) not only increases preferences (Reber
et al., 1998) and validity judgments (Reber & Schwarz,
1999) but also produces higher activity over the
zygmaticus major, indicating the elicitation of positive
affect (Harmon-Jones & Allen, 2001; Winkielman &
Cacioppo, 2001). Thus, another implication of this work
is that mood states might sometimes be triggered not by
the affective features of a stimulus but by its processing
status.
The fact that familiarity and positivity are so closely
associated that one can lead to the false perception of
the other does have some implications for classifications
that posit experiences such as mood and familiarity as
representing quite different classes of feelings. At least in
some views, familiarity has been conceptualized as a cog-
nitive, nonaffective state, as opposed to mood, which is a
noncognitive, affective feeling (Clore, 1992; Schwarz &
Clore, 1996). According to such views, cognitive states
function to indicate the status of one’s knowledge,
whereas affective feelings function to indicate how much
and in what way something is good or bad (Clore &
Parrott, 1994). As a cognitive experience, familiarity is
not expected to be associated with either goodness or
badness, whereas as an affective feeling, mood signals
just such valence (Schwarz & Clore, 1996). If, however, as
our research seems to indicate, familiarity is affectively
charged, such distinctions seem to break down and
appear to undermine these criteria for distinguishing
states as affective or as cognitive.
A second possible implication of our claim is that
some effects attributed to positive mood may be
explained by its integral relation with familiarity. For
example, we have argued elsewhere that this close rela-
tionship between familiarity and positive affect may help
to explain the impact that such affect has in information
processing (Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 2000). The expe-
rience of a general diffuse state of positive affect reliably
increases top-down, less-detailed processing in a variety
of domains (for a review, see Garcia-Marques, 1999;
Schwarz & Clore, 1996). This is just the impact that some
theorists have claimed for familiarity (Johnston & Haw-
ley, 1994; Reder & Ritter, 1992). Not surprisingly, then,
we have been able to show that familiarity exerts parallel
effects to positive mood in the moderation of processing
modes, with familiarity, similar to positive mood, engag-
ing nonanalytical, superficial processing of information
(Claypool, Mackie, Garcia-Marques, McIntosh, & Udall,
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in press; Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 2001). We suggested
that positive mood may have this effect even when it
arises from other unrelated sources because of its inher-
ent association with familiarity. Because familiarity trig-
gers nonanalytic processing and familiarity is positive,
the experience of positivity is often misattributed to
familiarity, with a concomitant decrease in analytic pro-
cessing. We also suggest that mood state, rather than
necessarily reflecting how benign our environment is,
may reflect how familiar our environment is.
Although theoretically important, our results imply
some practical advice. Imagine being considered as a
possible suspect for a crime and having to participate in a
police lineup, in which an eyewitness is asked to identify
anyone he or she might have previously seen at the crime
scene. Remember not to smile: Especially if you are in
fact a novel stimulus, any associated positive affect might
increase your chances of being falsely recognized!
NOTES
1. In a pretest, we verified that smiling faces were perceived more
positively than faces with neutral expressions. Fifteen male University
of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB), students viewed 20 photos on a
computer screen, each for 2 s. Each participant saw the photos in a dif-
ferent random order. Ten of the photos had men with a smiling facial
expression and 10 had a neutral expression. There was a between-
subjects counterbalance condition with two levels. For roughly half of
the participants, a particular pictured individual had a smiling expres-
sion, but for the other half of the participants, that same person had a
neutral expression. Thus, across these two conditions, all persons were
seen both with a smiling and a neutral expression. This factor resulted
in no main effects or interactions so it was dropped from the analysis.
Participants were asked to rate how positive they believed each face to
be on a 7-point scale. A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a main
effect of facial expression, F(1, 14) = 194.469, p < .001. Smiling faces
were judged as more positive (M = 5.32) than those with neutral expres-
sions (M = 2.92).
2. To ensure the validity of our paradigm, we first replicated repeti-
tion and priming effects with the materials developed for Experiment
2. Following Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989), we asked 58 participants
to study 30 neutral Portuguese words presented for 1 s on the computer
screen. After a filler task (in which they identified 20 different Euro-
pean countries), participants were shown 60 words, half of which were
old (seen in the study phase) and half new. Half of the old and half of
the new words were first presented subliminally before appearing
supraliminally, and the other half of the old and new words were not.
Results show a main effect of repetition, F(1, 56) = 190.63, p < .0001,
such that old words were correctly recognized as old compared to new
words, and a main effect of priming F(1, 56) = 6.53, p < .014, such that
self-primed words were more likely to be judged as familiar than non-
self-primed words. These results replicate Jacoby and Whitehouse’s
findings and indicate that our materials were capable of producing
familiarity effects in a standard repetition-priming paradigm. Follow-
ing Murphy and Zajonc (1993), we also ascertained that subliminally
preceding 30 Greek characters with either the happy face or circle as
within-subject primes resulted in participants preferring the characters
preceded by a happy face (M = 3.7, SD =.51) as opposed to those pre-
ceded by the circle (M = 3.4, SD = .53), t(46)= 2.28, p < .02. Thus, our
materials also were capable of producing the affective priming effects.
3. Type of prime also interacted with the particular set of words with
which it was associated, F(1, 48) = 11.53, p < .002, MSe = 4.87, suggesting
that some words facilitate positive recognition judgments regardless of
condition. Of importance, the particular material set used did not
qualify the interaction with the old or new status of the words.
4. Because feelings of familiarity might vary with, and thus affect the
judgment of, any actual stimulus sentence (Begg & Armour, 1991), and
because such feelings of familiarity might disrupt a manipulation of
mood, we created a situation in which participants could use only their
affective state in making their judgments.
5. The proportions of true responses also were analyzed regarding
guessing. The statistics associated with the one-sample test for the
parameter of a binominally distributed variables and the one-tailed
p values associated with it were then computed for each condition.
Results show that true responses of positive mood participants were
significantly higher than 50% (Z = 1.71, p < .044) and true responses
of nonpositive mood participants were marginally less than 50% (Z =
–1.41, p < .079).
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